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A foundation for Pareto optimality
Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto optimal alternatives at each profile of individual preferences? Using the framework of fixed-agenda social choice theory, we present a characterization of the Pareto optimal social choice correspondence. We introduce a new independence condition, P-independence. When combined with three natural assumptions, P-independence leads to the conclusion that the social choice set and the Pareto optimal set are the same.
Fixed agenda , Oligarchy , P-independence , P-oligarchy , Pareto optimal social choice correspondence
Duddy, C. and Piggins, A. (2020) 'A foundation for Pareto optimality', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 88, pp. 25-30. doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005